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Between 1874 and 1878 Britain's Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, devised large 
plans for Af'rica which cane to nothing. Natal and the Cape Colony were to be 
federated with the Boer republics to form a single South African dominion. A 
concessionary company would, with the blessing of the British government, undertake 
to open East Africa to "commerce and civilisation". Until recently, historians 
treated Carnamonls schemes as something of a puzzle. Robinson and Galleer 
discussed them as attempts "to uphold a traditional paramountcy for the old strategic 
reasons11. (2) C. F. Goodfellow proved that Carnarvonls plans were far too vast to 
fit Robinson and Gallagherq S "reactive" theory of British expansion but could find 
ncthing better than Carnamon9 S personality to account for them. (3) In a seminal 
article, Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore have re'cently suggested that the solutions to 
this and other puzzles can be found in the imperatives of the developing southern 
African economy. (4) In particular, the need for a secure and regular flow of migrant 
labour may have provided a powerful new incentive for confederation under the British 
flag. Marks and Atmore go on to argue that, whether or not Carnarvon fully grasped 
the economic advantages of Confederation, Theophilus Shepstone certainly did and 
spelled them out clearly in official memoranda written during his governorship of the 
Transvaal. 
The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that it was indeed Shepstone 
who most clearly understood the connection between labour supply and imperial 
prosperity in southern Africa. Behind Shepstone stood a dedicated group of 
eqansionists in Natal. From their perspective the road to central Africa lay along 
the eastern border of the Transvaal. The road was destined, they believed, not only 
to carry European agents into the interior but also to carry black labour sou-th. It 
was vital that Transvaal Bfrikaners, Portuguese and the rulers of formidable African 
kingdoas be precluded from blocking the developing two-ww traffic. Shepstonels 
advice to Carnarvon dxming the period of attempted confederation emphasized these 
economic factors and echoed simj.lar advice proffered by Lt-Governor Southey in 
Griqualand West . 
Eimansionists in Natal 
It is important at the outset to understand the social and economic 
baclcgmund of expansionists in Natal. When Carnarvon came to the Colonial Office in 
1874 the white population of Natal was tiny - about seventeen thousand persons, seven 
thousand of whom lived in the villages of Durban and Pietermaritzburg. (5) In the 
historiography of Natal, these people usually figure as an undifferentiated master 
class. But there was always a clearly discernible economic and social dlite. It 
comprised, at most, one or two hundred families who for various reasons were acutely 
aware of the importance of the African hinterland beyond. Economically most 
important were coastal sugar planters. It was estimated in 1872 that £3,000-5,000 
were required to establish a viable plantation. (6) Reliable supplies of labour were 
vital to investors on this scale. Despite the perennial cries of inland farmers and 
townspeople (the nup-cowtrytt party) for hi& taxes which would drive Africans on to 
the labour market, the coastal planters knew from experience that the black population 
of Natal, with or without reserves, polygamous or monogamous, could not support itself 
and, at the same time, supply a reliable labour force to the plantations. The coast 
men were keen to import labour from outside, whether African, Indian or Chinese, and 
realized that Natal could not prosper as a self-contained island. (7) The great interest of the planters was to see that labour migration from the east and central 
African interior was established on a systematic and reliable basis. (8) 
Importers of trading goods were equally concerned with Natalls African 
hinterland. Since the 1840s, the inland. trade in items destined for African 
consumers had grown enomously. Its progress can be measured directly in the import 
statistics recorded in Natalls Blue Books. The duties charged on these imports - ' 
first beads and blankets, later axes, ploughs and greatcoats - were one of many ways 
in which the white settlers of Natal battened upon the African econoqy. Legislative 
councillors, unconcerned either with internal trade or the interior itself, imposed 
steadily mounting tariffs. A major debate occurred in 1872-3 between the importers 
and the taxers on the sensitive issue of guns. Durban merchants, backed by some 
newspaper editors, complained that as a consequence of the imposts on firearms and 
the prohibition against selling guns to local Africans Natal was losing trade to the 
Cape. ( 9 )  Even after the expedition against Langalibalele in 1873 had raised a 
general alarm on fiream, Legislative Council members for coastal districts continued 
to oppose the raising of imposts. 
Important .planters, traders (and missionaries interested in converting the 
populations of Central Africa) were the natural allies of imperial expansionists at 
Government House. Their interests in imported labour, exported goods and the 
development of the African interior led most of them to support the work of the 
Secretary for Native Affairs, Natalls most dedicated expansionist. 
Shepstonel S Role 
Shepstone is sometimes portrayed as the dedicated defender of African lands 
and culture who consistently opposed rapacious schemes of exploitation devised by 
white settlers. (10) This image neglects his organization of the labour market, his 
unstinting support for the interests of larger capitalist investors, and his grand 
schemes for the eventual exploitation of southern Africals human and mineral resources. 
In the first place, it is not true that Shepstone was perpetually at odds with the 
settlers. The Natal Witness called him "a hem and a sovereign whose name is a strong 
towerft when he was made a Cl% in 1869. (11) The nabobs of Ma,ritzburg elected him 
President of -he Natal Rifle Association; his sons were officers of the militia; he 
was the leading layman of the Church of Ehgland and a promoter of railws and trade 
into the interior. (12) It was above all, as Bishop Colenso wrote before he broke 
off his long-standing friendship, "the most influential planters on the Coast - those 
who have most invested in the colony, and therefore most to lose from mismanag.ementtl - 
who were ~lwarm supporters of W Shepstone". (13) The principal reason for this 
support was Shepstonels widespread reputation among big employers as an "unfailing 
source of labour". (14) 
Shepstonels efforts to direct black labour to white employers went back to 
the earliest stages of his career as Secretary for Native Affairs. In 1852 he 
attempted to prod Africans on to the labour market by remitting the taxes of those who 
served colonial farmers. (15) In collaboration with Lt-Governor Pine, Shepstone 
supported the Refugee Law of 1854 which made every black inrmigrant to Natal liable to 
three years of service at fixed wages. Later he arranged exemption from the 
regulations for all "single natives entering the colony to seek service under 
engagements for twelve months or more". (16) Officials who required labour for public 
works and farmers who needed extra help at harvest time applied to Shepstone's 
magistrates and chiefs for cheap black workers. Nor did Shepstone scruple to 
interfere with the operations of the free market. He drafted legislation for 
Pieternaritzburg in 1873 which forced Africans who remained more than five da;ys in the 
town to accept any work offered to them at a standard monthly rate. This would, 
Shepstone conceived, prevent llcombination to exact from the necessities of employers, 
higher wages than as a rule the service is worth" and would encourage "the natural and 
desirable relations of master and servantf1. (17) 
As Natalts labour reservoir expanded northwards towards the Zambezi, 
Shepstone came to believe that the reorganization of African governments was 
inevitable. He had long believed that circumstances WO- always "force the civilised 
man, when he inhabits the same country with the savage, to encroach upon the 
unoccupied lands claimed by the latter". (18) His abiding fear was that a general 
anti-European combination of independent African rulers migttt prevent the peaceful 
extension of imperial rule. Such considerations made Shepstone a theoretical 
expansionist. His experience in %magingU the population of Natal convinced him 
that expansion could be made to pay for itself and was, therefore, eminently practical 
as well. The hut taxes, fines and imposts levied on Africans not only paid the 
salaries of police and magistrates but supported most of the entire government of 
Natal. Far from believing that his system of indirect rule especially suited the 
Nguni people, as his admirers sometimes assert, Shepstone tho-t his administrative 
procedures would easily govern "any class, country or nation" of Africans south of the 
Zambezi. (19) From the early 1850s he actively sought an opportunity to prove his 
i 
theory by establishing a black kingdom free of white settlers, with himself as 
tlsupreme chief". (20) With Sir George Grey he plotted to partition Zululand in 1860 I 
and throughout most of the following decade mulled over schemes to ingest Lesotho. (21) 
The editor of the Witness hailed him proudly in 1868 as Ifthe one-day-to-be Governor 1 
General of all the native tribes residing between the Cape and the Zambezi". (22) I 
Shepstone's imagination focused particularly upon a disputed piece of territory between I 
the Transvaal and Zululand which he looked upon as the "golden bridge" to African 
empire, a corridor which could carry black labour to Natal and export British 
imperialism to the far interior. Had he accomplished his dream, he would have created 
a via re ia to eclipse the celebrated "missionary road1' thro~# Bechuanaland to 
&-(2 J) Shepstonef S interest in the interior was more than merely official or 
vainglorious, for the Shepstone family was from time to time directly involved in 
schemes for the economic exploitation of African resources. Shepstone prospected for 
gold, sent his sons to dig at the Kimberley diamond fields and did what he could to 
further the mining ventures of friends. (24) 
For all these reasons Shepstone was the willing ally of the important 
private interests who were pushing expansion into the interior. So, too, were a 
number of his associates and subordinates in government. Captain Lucas, Resident 
Magistrate of Xlip River, had great success as a big game hunter and diamond digger 
in the interior. (25) Two sons of lvlajor Erskine, Natal's Colonial Secretary, used 
their official connections to set up business as traders and labour recruiters in 
Mogambique. (26) Taken together, the expansionists of coast, port, and Government 
House were not numerous, but their interests were intertwined and in the special new 
circumstances of the 1870s they exercised an influence disproportionate to their 
numbers, or even their capital. 
New Factors of the 1870s 
Thxee new factors changed the face of southern Africa in the late 1860s and 
eventually produced a revolution of opinion at the Colonial Office. Each of these 
factors involved an aspect of African labour supply as well as agents of empire 
located in Natal. It will be argued that, as a result of these intrusive new 
considerations, the perceptions of Depstone a d  the expansive intexests of Natal 
became, for a brief period, British imperial policy. The three new factors were 
mineral discoveries, the establishment of regular labour migration routes, and the 
campaign against the slave trade which Livingstone had extended to central and east 
Africa. 
Prom 1867, diamond discoveries in Griqualand West made headlines around the 
world and attracted thousands of white and black diggers. But they were only one 
result of many ventures in mineral exploration. Encouraging traces of gold were found 
in Zululand; copper was thought to exist in significant quantities in the Transkei; 
gold had been found in many places in the Transvaal; and, though the treasures of the 
Witwatersrand would remain hidden until 1886, ten years earlier Englishmen were 
already hoping for the annexation of what was said to be "one of the worldts richest 
countriesv1. (27) At Udenburg on the eastern border of the Transvaal (shepstonet S 
bridge to the north), gold mining began in the territory claimed by Chief Sekhukhune. 
Further to the north Mauchts discovery of the ruins of Zimbabwe (reported in Natal 
newspapers with speculations about King Solomonts mines and the Biblical 0phir) 
coincided with gold-seeking in the territory of Lobengulats Ndebele. (28) 
Shepstone and Natalians were in the thick of these ventures. Not long after 
Captain Lucas and Shepstonets sons tried their luck at the diamond fields, the Rhodes 
brothers Herbert and Cecil gave up their cotton plantation and followed after.(29) 
Successful gold-seekers also followed Shepstonets leads. G. J. Black, who took an 
exploring party xiorth from Potchefstroom, Transvaal, praised the information he had 
received from Shepstone "whose name is a host in itself among the native tribes of 
Central Africa". (30) Nearly twenty years before the famous Rudd concession laid the 
foundation for Rhodests British South Africa Compw, Shepstone smoothed the way for 
the London and Limpopo Mining Company which won a mineral concession from Lobengula. 
In 1870, Sir John Swinburnets agent, A. L. Levert, was accompanied by Shepstonets 
trusted messenger, Eli jah Kambule, and one of Natal? S Border Agents, Captain Frederic 
Elton, formerly of the Indian Army. (31) 
The second new factor in official thinking about southern Africa was the 
sudden burgeoning of migrant labour moving along several clearly identifiable streams. 
Demand at the diamond fields for a long time exceeded supply, and as a result wages 
were paid far in excess of anything offered to unskilled African workers in Natal or 
the Cape. Within a few years large streams of labour had been diverted from existing 
channels. The new British goverrrment of Griqualand West took an active interest in 
labour supply and studied with particular care the sources of the various streams. (32) 
There are some surprises. While nearby Sotho groups supplied so much labour that 
llBasutoll was for a time the generic term for all blacks on the fields, astonishingly 
large numbers came from distant territories. Thousands came from Shangane territory 
in the eastern Transvaal and Mogambique; by 1874 Shona from beyond Matabeleland were 
arriving in increasing numbers. There were also some surprising absentees: Zulus 
and Ndebele stayed away. Private enterprise speedily recognized an opportunity for 
surer and steadier profits than could be had sifting gravel. "Labour touts" and 
recruiting  gang^ fanned out in search of friendly, industrious workers who would not 
Ifset an inordinate value upon their labour, as most of the natives have been taught 
to dov1. (33) They were to find that the principal obstacle to labour recruitment lay 
not so much in the supply but in the supply routes which ran through or along the 
Afrikaner republics. Tales of labow: piracy became widespread. 
Meanwhile, white Natalians reacted with predictable anger against the 
diversion of labour away from the colony. As early as 1866, over one thousand Sotho 
workers had passed through the Newcastle Division on their way to jobs in Natal. (34) 
Now the traffic was reversed. Planters set out to find ways of diverting additional 
migrant workers to Natal. A "Tabour League" was established in Durban late in 1872 
with the special object of facilitating the passage of labour through neighbouring 
territories. Most of their early effort was directed toward Mo~ambique and Zululand. 
After some negotiation the governor of Lourengo Marques allowed the League to build 
llKraals" at Delagoa Bay, where men from the interior could obtain food and shelter 
while awaiting a sea passage to Durban. (35) An alternative overland route lay 
through Zululand, where the power of the monarch presented difficulties. At first the 
League employed John Dunn, Cetshwayots famous "white indunan, but cut its links with 
him when Dunn began making individual labour contracts on his own account. It then 
turned to Shepstone, who had already won the League's respect for effective 
negotiations on its behalf. (36) The invitation to represent Natal at the coronation 
of Cetshwayo as Zulu monarch, in 1873, presented the opporl;unity Shepstone had been 
seeking to regularize the passage of labour through Zululand. The coronation is 
chiefly remembered by historians as the occasion on which Shepstone recommended "lawsn 
to the new king which later became one excuse for the Zulu War. But Shepstone's 
recommendation that the Zulu invitation be accepted placed the labour supply question 
foremost: 
It gives us an advantageous position in any arrangement 
facilitating the ingress of the labourers who wish 
to come into the Colony and in providing for their 
safety on the shortest way back to their homes with 
their earnings, it also gives us the right to interfere 
in the external policy of the Zulus. (37) 
A plantersQeleegtion to Governor Pine in August was told that their labour needs 
would be ameliorated by the arrangements Shepstone was then making. Coastal 
representatives in the Legislative Council expressed considerable satisfaction at the 
final agreement. 
It was from Shepstone and his border agent, Elton, that a Select Committee 
of the Legislative Council obtained most of the infoxmation used to support its 1 
report on the llIntroduction of Native Labourers from beyond the Border of the Colonyf1 
in 1872. (38) The report confirmed the conclusions being reached at the same time by 
the government of Griqualand West. The great labour catchment area of southern Africa 
was a coastal strip of 150-300 miles wide which extended from the Natal border l 
northwards to the Zambezi, excluding only "the military Zulu tribes, who as a rule are I 
disinclined to manual labourll. Here was a potential pool of several million workers. 
Throughout those territories the name of the Natal government was said to be known and l 
respected. No advertisements were necessary to "create a desire in this immense mass I 
of foreign native population to seek service in Natal1'; the parties of men arriving I 
daily proved that the desire already existed. What was required was an agent to be 
stationed near Lydenburg in the Transvaal to whom job seekers could go for up-to-date 
information about wages and mutes to Natal. All along the main paths of migration 
inexpensive resting places and depots of food and fuel should be pmvided. 
The Committee identified three principal migration routes. One ran over 
difficult and inhospitable country in the Transvaal, striking the colony about ei&ty 
miles west of the lower end of the Newcastle division. Another ran from coastal 
Mogambique directly through Zululand, where migrants were likely to be robbed. The 
third mute ran roughly midway between the first two and strai&t throw the middle 
of the disputed territory between Zululajld and the Transvaal. This was none other 
than Shepstone's bridge to the interior, the area he had long hoped to rule as a 
black kingdom, the outlet for Natal's surplus population. It was the road to the 
north. 
1 
Renewed interest in the suppression of slave trading was the third factor 
which upset established opinion about southern Africa in the 1870s. Livingstonels I 
discoveries, his meeting with Stanley, the dramatic circumstances of his death and 
burial, stirred an unprecedented public curiosity concerning East Africa. In 1872 
the Foreign Office announced its intention to negotiate an anti-slavery treaty with I l 
the Sultan of Zanzibar. Dr John Kirk, the seasoned acting Consul at Zanzibar, seemed 
an obvious man for the mission but he had not got along well with Livingstone and was 
in bad odour at the India Office, which kept a close watch on the interests of Indian 
nationals on the African coast. (39) Instead, Lord Gmville chose Sir Bartle Were, 1 l 
a former governor of Bombay who was on excellent terns with religious and 1 
philanthropic bodies in England. mere took a spacious view of East African affairs. l 
'lThere is", he noted, "a tempting opening for an Empire in East Africa at the disposal 
of any great naval power; but common honesty forbids us to undertake a great 
Philanthropic enterprise of this kind, and to find in it the coarse material reward 
of extended dominion." Britain had "succeeded without seeking it and almost without 1 
knowing it, to a dominant position and immense commercial interests in East Africaf1.(40) 1 
l 
Interested parties were not slow to catch the drift of Frerels thinking. 
William Mackinnon, the shipping magnate, philanthropist and future folmder of the 
British East Africa Company, made plans for increased mail and passenger services to 
East Africa via Suez. (41) In Natal there was jubilation at the news that anti- 
slavery measures and passenger services were to be extended down the Indian Ocean 
coast. The jubilation had nothing to do with philanthropy and everything to do with 
the labour market. The editor of the Mercury predicted that the packet service to 
South Africa would soon convince the Sultan of Zanzibar that sending free labour to 
Natal was infinitely more profitable than sending slaves to Persia or Arabia. (42) 
Slaves freed on the east coast would find a "natural homew in Natal and could be 
carried cheaply on Mackinnonls ships. (43) Furthemore, British intervention in East 
Africa would 
open up the trade all along the coast, and place Natal 
in a better position for pressing on the Tmperial 
Government the necessity of buying the Portuguese 
Government out of the country south of the Zambezi ... 
Natal must consequently carry out a Monroe doctrine of 
its own, and insist that the Anglo-Saxon race shall 
hold undisputed sway from Capetown to the Zambezi. 
Besides, we wish to obtain a supply of labour for our 
coast planters from these localities, and this we will 
never be able to do satisfactorily until we have contm 
of the various ports. (44) 
The Foreign Office in large measure sympathized with Natal's aspirations. Frerels 
suggestion that some freed slaves could be sent to m n c h  islands was vetoed on the 
ground that British colonies, particularly Natal, could take an indefinite number. (45) 
The Colonial Office agreed that the needs of South Africa should be preferred even to 
those of the Seychelles. (46) All these suggestions were seconded enthusiastically by 
Frederic Elton, Shepstone's general factotum on labour affairs, who in March 1873 was 
sent by the Natal Government to Mozambique and Zanzibar to eqlore the possibility of 
obtaining labour along the coast north of Natal. (47) 
By the early 1870s mineral d$scoveries and plantation agriculture had 
effected far-reaching changes in the labour market, which affected a vast sweep of the 
African continent from Cape Town to Mombasa. There was every prospect that the 
changes would be permanent. Far-sighted individuals perceived that political 
fragmentation was a formidable bar to the effective organization of labour supply and 
were therefore attracted by schemes for confederation under the British flag. 
Continued prosperity depended on an unimpeded movement of labour which was difficult, 
if not impossible, to guarantee among independent African kingdoms, Afrikaner republics, 
Portuguese Mogambique and the rival colonies of Natal and the Cape. There were two 
aspects of political fragmentation and the strengthening of independent African chiefs 
which particularly worried Natal's officials and expansionists. One was the 
possibility that the Boer republics and the Portuguese, working separately or in 
tandem, would block southern access to the human and material resources of the northern 
interior, The other was that Africans would use their new wealth to arm themselves 
against the whites. 
Experience at the diamond fields seemed to show that the Transvaal would 
maliciously interfere with labour migration. At least three important migration paths 
to Kimberley ran directly through the republics: one from Lesotho; one from northern 
Natal; aYld the third from the interior of Mogambique, beyond the eastern Transvaal. 
The diggers considered the republics as hostile territory. Chiefs were said to be 
refusing to endanger their people's lives by allowing them to travel through the 
Transvaal where they were likely to be impressed as farm labour or worse. (48) 
British administrators backed up the diggers' complaints; they were particularly 
concerned about the large numbers of workers coming from the Pedi people under Chief 
Sekhukhune. Of potentially greater moment was Transvaal interference with labour 
coming down the ttmissionary roadft from beyond the Limpopo. Lt-Governor Southey worried 
constantly about Boer c o ~ d o  raids on migrant workers and about the ever more 
extensive western land claims put forward in Pretoria. (49) Owen Lanyon, who replaced 
Southey in 1875, warned the Colonial Office that, "if there be any intention of keeping 
this country as a separate colony, some d w  you will have to annex all the country 
lying to the northtf. Until that time *ere would be Ifcontinual strife going on 
between the Kafirs and the Boers, and there will be consequently a difficulty in 
getting sufficient labour for the minesn. (50) President Burgers of the Transvaal 
was widely rumoured to be plotting western annexations which would block obvious 
fu'mm labour supply routes to Kimberley and the Cape, (51) 
Natal's experiences were very similar, but in her case the Portuguese and 
Zulus loomed largest as obstacles to labour supply. Shepstone's mission to Zululand 
in 1873 alleviated part of the problem, but the Portuguese remained. There had been 
continuous complaints about Portuguese interference with trade since the 1850s; 
labour problems arose in the 1870s. (52) David Leslie, a private trader from Natal, 
I com2lained to Shepstone that every sort of obstacle was being thrown in the of I his efforts to establish a labour supply business at Delagoa Bay. (53) St Vincent 
, Erskine, the son of Natal's Colonial Secretary, was unable to carry out his mission 
I to discuss labour supply with the inland chief Mzila because of Portuguese 
officiousness. He explained that "the fact of the matter is that a considerable 
revenue is derived from direct traffic in migrant labour] with Natal [from Delagoa 
I Bay] and the authorities are alarmed at the possibility of its being diverted to 
another channeln. (54) 
G m - d n g  posed more complicated questions because it enriched colonial 
ports and traders even as it raised the potential stakes in any future war between 
black and white. Southey thou&t it hpossible to stop gun-trading at Kimberley 
because there were so many points of ingress from territories under different 
governments who profited from the transit trade. (55) All British colonies deplored 
the landing of fire- in Mogambique, but when it was proposed to ban the trade to 
Africans in Natal there was an immediate protest from Durban traders. (56) 
A sjmilar dilemma arose with respect to the independent and semi-independent 
African kingdoms. If, like the Zulu and the Ndebele, they did not export labour, they 
were condemned for erecting barriers to trade. If, like the Pedi and the Sotho, they 
supplied a great deal of labour, they were suspected of a rm ing  themselves for evil 
purposes, As obstacles or potential enemies, important African polities stretched 
half-way around the compass from Zululand to Matabeleland. Fear that these peoples 
would combine cast a shadow over South African questions. It was abetted by Shepstone, 
who knew that important chiefs had long been in touch with each other and who had 
always believed in the possibility of a general anti-white conspiracy. (57) 
Each of the new factors in the southern African environment - mineral 
discoveries, reneved anti-slavery activity and labour supply problems - involved 
Shepstone and his agents in a direct way. He browt to these questions not only his 
long experience but also his perceptions of the colonial environment, which were 
shared by the expansionists in Natal. It remains to show how these perceptions and 
the conclusions Shepstone drew from them became for a time Britain's official policy 
for southern Africa. 
Natal's Influence on Plans for Confederation 
Confederation appealed to Lord Kimberley while Colonial Secretary in 
Gladstone's government, primaxily as a money-saver. Questions of labour supply did 
not at first affect his thinking. In 1870 he regarded immigrant black labour in 
Natal as a temporary phenomenon which would disappear as the "labour of the Natives 
of Natal" was "gradually becoming more available1'. (58) It was the annexation of 
Griqualand West which brought into sharp focus the problems of migrant labour in a 
politically fragmented subcontinent. Before the annexation, KYlatchbuJ-l-Hugessen at 
the Colonial Office adhered to the established wisdom of twenty years' standing: "we 
do not wish to extend our South African possessions .lf (59) After the annexation, when 
the republics began to interfere with labour supply, he changed his tune: 
These Boers must be taught to respect British subjects. 
Every day shows in a stronger light the mistake that 
was made in abandoning the Orange River territory 
[in 1854i6;)these people axe worse neighbours than the 
Kafirs . 
Kimberley agreed with this assessment, just as he came to agree that the destiny of 
the Transkei was tfconsolidation under British ruleu and that a "little warw in 
Zululand leading to the same result was on the cards. (61) The great obstacle to 
confederation was the Cape Colonyts remal to accept the gift of Griqualand West. 
Afrikaners in the Cape Colony sympathized with Afrikaners in the republics who felt 
they had been robbed when Britain claimed the territory. Though the diamonds were 
worth millions, the tiny colony could not p w  for itself and hence was a burden on the 
British treasury. By the time of the general election of 1874, a wag had still not 
been found to attach Griqualand West to the Cape while at the same time persuading the 
republics to join a confederation. 
Grj.qualand West neatly (and fearsomely) brought together accumulating 
problems of labour supply, defence and imperial expenditure. Its annual deficit in 
government accounts was a festering symptom of troubles which would not go away, 
because they arose from irresistible and irreversible forces of economic change. The 
connection between diamond-digging, labour supply and Natal became dramatically 
apparent at the end of 1873. Langalibalele, Chief of the Hlubi of north-western Natal, 
refused to answer a summons charging him with failure to register gum b r u t  into 
the colony by Hlubi labourers returning from the diamond fields. (62) An escalation of 
fear among white farmers and Hlubi peasants caused the latter to flee into neighbouring 
Lesotho. At the first and only military encounter between fleeing Hlubi and pursuing 
colonials, the settler forces panicked and ran away, leaving six of their fellows dead 
on the field. News of the event ran through white Natal like sheet lightening, 
discharging thirty yearst store of accumulated hate and fear. Atrocities committed on 
the Hlubi and their unoffending neighbours were trumpeted in the press. Apart from 
Bishop Colenso, who courageously took the Hlubi side, divisions in the white community 
were submerged in a rare displa~r of unanimity. When Colenso announced his intention 
to go to London and plead on behalf of the Hlubi, the government hurriedly a r r w d  
for Shepstone to state the other side of the case. 
The Langalibalele affair was precisely the sort of crisis which the Colonial 
Office had a l v s  feared would arise in Natal. But the close reading of despatches 
had barely begun when Disraeli turned Gladstone out of office and Lord Carmarnon 
replaced Kimberley as Colonial Secretary. Carnarvon was justifiably outraged by the 
reports from Natal but uncertain about the course he should take. The continuing 
problems of Griqualand West inspired him to write in August 1874 that "these South 
African questions are a terrible labyrinth of which it is hard to find the cluett.(63) 
Shepstone arrived in London in the same month to give him a great many of the clues he 
wanted. 
Most historians have echoed the complaints of his contemporaries that 
Shepstone was excessively reticent about revealing motives and policies. (64) But 
there is enough in Carnarvonts private papers and Shepstone's memoranda to reconstruct 
the substance of the advice he respectfully tendered in September 1874. The Colonial 
Office at first hesitated to approve Shepstone's visit, but when he arrived Robert 
Herbert, the Permanent Under-Secretary, recommended that Carnarvon see him at once. 
Shepstone was, he explained, "a gentleman of high character and ability" and "probably 
there are very few men in the Colonial service equal to himt1. (65) Carnarvon met 
Shepstone several times in September, and shortly afterwards he amounced to his staff 
that he had decided what should be done about Native Policy in South Africa. (66) 
Shepstonets exposition of South African affairs began with an explanation of the 
Langalibalele fiasco. The intrusion of Governor Pine and hot-headed settlers into the 
punitive expedition was the s o m e  of all troubles. What was needed, according to 
Shepstone, was a new constitution which would protect African administration and 
finance from the rapacious and irresponsible ttup-country party". This could be done 
by strengthening either the official or the coastal represer~tation in the Legislative 
Council. (67) 
For the orderly administration of the African population of Natal, 
Shepstone recommended a paradoxical combination of immigration and emigration. Three 
years earlier, he had &awn attention of the Lt-Governor to the problems of 
administration posed by the influx of migrant workers. (68) Indirect rule throu& 
chiefs and the principle of "tribal responsibility1' could not be applied to these 
temporary residents whose numbers might soon rise as high as 20,000 men. A force of 
Natal Nguni police under the command of Shepstone's own white staff was needed to 
record the movements and curb the misbehaviour of the migrants. (69) At the same 
time that these measures were taken to control temporary residents, urgent attention 
should be paid to the problem of "surplusf1 resident Africans. Shepstonets solution 
was, of course, his old scheme for a black kingdom to be located between the 
Transvaal and Zululand on the golden bridge to the north. (70) By this simple 
expedient, uncongenial African poups in Natal would find a happier home, a vital 
labour supply mute would be permanently secured, the Boer republics would be denied 
access to the sea and a road would be kept open to the north in an expanding dominion 
where Africans would be governed in accordance with Shepstonian precepts: 
That ultimately this will also be occupied by Eumpeans 
cmnot be doubted, but if the land can be acquired, and 
put to the purpose I have suggested, the present tension 
in Natal will be relieved, and time be gained to admit 
of the introduction of a larger proportion of white 
colonists ... But it will be a mistake to suppose that 
the relief afforded by this measuse would be but 
temporary or that the difficulty it is proposed to abate 
could ever again reach its present dimensions; because 
the outlet being to the North, the abatement admits of 
permanent extension towards a climate unsuited to 
Ebropeans but not so to natives . . . (71) 
For Shepstone, keeping the peace among millions of blacks in southern Africa was far 
too important to be left to ignorant settler politicians, or even to imperial troops 
without special knowledge of local conditions. At any time a false move might  
provoke a genera.1 rising of African kingdoms from the southern coast to the Limpopo. 
The best general police force was that which he had recommended for Natal in 1871 
(and would later recommend for the ~ransvaal) : "a Zulu force with a Ehropean officer 
(gentleman) to say every 50 men - no white sergeants." (72) 'This device was but one 
part of the general model of administration Shepstone had evolved in Natal, where 
he had proved that the governance of Africans could be made to pay its own way. 
Taxes, fines a.nd duties imposed on Africans supported practically the entire public 
administration of Natal; they could pay for the administration of all Africans 
south of the Zambezi. (73) The methods used by Shepstone to regulate the supply and 
behaviour of migcant labour were equally capable of extension td other places. 
This conception of an expanding British dominion was visionary, but it 
could be soberly.defended by arguments founded upon its inner logic and the public 
record of Shepstone's work in Natal. It recognized that Africans would always out- 
number whites and that the development of established colonies required a permanent 
supply of black labour. The future reservoirs would be, not the already overcrowded 
little locations of Nata1,but the vast northern hinterland. All that stood in the 
wa~r of the achievement of the vision was political f-entation and the threat of 
hostilities with African rulers. 
There is no definite proof that Carnarvon adopted Shepstone's vision in 
its entirety, but subsequent events indicated clearly that Carnarvon was profoundly 
impressed by the meetings of September 1874. Bishop Colenso fumed to see his former 
friend (now his bitter enemy) heaped up with honows and a special conunission. He 
felt that Carnarvon had been gulled by Shepstone on the question of the disputed 
territory in Zululasld, just as he himself had been gulled years before, and that 
Shepstonefs mistaken views on confederation had perverted Carnarvon's judgement. 
When Shepstone was made a K W  and given the vital task of bringing the Transvaal 
under British rule, Colenso accused Carnarvon of sacrificing justice for Hlubi to 
the "mere policyf1 of Confederation. (74) On the great questions of labour supply, 
African administration, negotiations with African states and even forecasting 
mineral discoveries, Shepstone possessed a unique combination of knowledge and 
experience. Until Carnarvonts resignation in 1878, Shepstonels opinions were 
continually sought on all these.matters and his views were to a considerable extent 
transferred verbatim to Colonial Office memoranda. 
C. F. Goodfellow singles out the historian J. A .  Froude as the greatest 
influence on Carnarvon during the period in which he evolved his confederation 
strategy. (75) But it is clear from official memoranda that, on the vital questions 
set out above, Carnarvon~s mind was essentially made up after Shepstonets visit in 
September and before Frouders letters from South Africa began arri~ring in December 
1874. Goodfellow himself admits that Froude had no part in the preparation of the 
famous despatch of 1875. (76) In fact, Froude was always lukewarm on confederation; 
late in 1875 Froude wrote to Colenso that Carnarvon Ifis under a misapprehension as 
to the character of the agitation which has been raised here and imagines that the 
Colonies are ripe for Confederation. I must hasten home to undeceive him." (77) 
If Shepstonels influence has been underestimated in the standard accounts 
of Carnarvonfs great experiment, the influence of Frederic Elton is simply ignored. 
Yet Elton was also ideally situated to provide information Cannarvon required on 
South-East and East Africa. He served on Shepstonel S staff, recruited labour, 
secured mining concessions and helped to suppress the slave trade. From the early 
1870s until his death in 1877, Elton moved nimbly backwards and forwards across the 
increasingly intricate web of economic relationships which linked the affairs of East, 
Central and Southern Africa. As a special envoy from Natal he undertook three 
commissions in 1873: to confer with the governor-general of Mozambique concerning 
labour migration from Delagoa Bay; to consult with the Sultan of Zanzibar and 
Portuguese officials on the use of the telegraphic cable to be laid from Aden; and 
to assist Sir Bartle Frere in his anti-slavery mission. Fxere valued Eltonls 
experience in India, found him an invaluable source of infoxmation on the lower East 
African coast and promptly appointed him assistant political agent and vice-consul 
at Zanzibar. (78) In April 1875 Elton became Britain's first full-time consul at 
Mozambique. (79) His links with Natal were maintained not only through frequent 
correspondence but also through a brief return as temporary Protector of Indian 
Irmnigrants during a period of convalescent leave in July 1874. (80) 
Eltonls advice to Frere and to the Foreign Office reflected his Natal 
experience. He particularly emphasized the connection between labour supply and 
slave trade suppression. The people called 'lAmatongall, he informed Frere in 1873, 
extended under several different names from Delagoa Bay to the Zambezi: 
These tribes who but a few years past were actively 
employed in ~collecting' men and women for their 
neighbours, have totally discontinued and could not 
now be tempted into resuming the slave traffic in 
a n ~ r  fom. They have discovered that all their wants 
can be sufficiently supplied by sending their young 
men down to Natal to work for three or four years . . . (81) 
Genuinely believing that the growth of labour migration would drive out slave trading, 
Elton continued his work as a labour recruiter. The Natal Merc congratulated him 
for "not losing sight of his former interests in N a t a e h i s  consular reports, 
which were routinely passed on to the Colonial Office to be filed with papers on 
Natal (another indication of the key role of the colony in this period), Elton 
revealed himself as an enthusiastic imperialist. He took every opportunity to 
denigrate Portugalts moribund colony whose real influence, he claimed, extended only 
a few miles inland along the whole ccast. (83) 
Eltonts immediate hope was the acquisition of Delagoa Bay; his ultimate 
ambition was the extinction of Portuguese rule on the east coast. He argued cogently 
that possession of Delagoa Bqy was essential to the success of confedektion. (84) 
In addition to the danger to British supremacy presented by the proposed Transvaal- 
Delagoa railwa;,, Elton emphasized the importance of controlling the firearms and 
labour trade. (85) His argument for the removal of Portuguese influence elsewhere 
arose from his interests in mineral exploration and labour recruitment in Central 
Africa, as well as from his anti-slavery fervour. He was indignant at the blocks 
thrown in the way of Natal's labour recruiters in Soshangane country and almed 
at the claims Portugal was attempting to stake out in the region of Lake Malawi and 
in Lobengula's country. (86) Elton had been a close friend of Herbert Rhodes since 
his residence in Natal and followed with interest Rhodes's career as an explorer and 
prospector after he left the diamond fields. By 1876 Rhodes was deeply involved in 
schemes for developing Central Africa and recognised the importance of Mopnbique as 
the most direct route to the interior. Elton was very willing to help and did much 
to smooth the ww for Rhodes and a party of Australian gold seekers in 1876. (87) The 
reports of mineral prospects emanating from Rhodes and Elton were e n o w  to stir even 
the jabd imaginations of Colonial Office clerks. On one of the reports W. R. Malcolm 
wrote: "There are rumours that the mountainous country about Lake Nyassa is enormously 
rich in minerals; a settler in the O.F. State said to me the other day that it would 
be one da;y the 'Nevada' of Africa." On the same despatch Camamon railed against 
Portuguese protectionism: 
there is not much information in this Office as to the 
character of the Country; but that which there is tends 
to the belief (if one can say as much) that there are 
minerals etc. That whether this be so or not, I object 
strongly to the grant of these [~ortuguese] monopolies 
which either close the trade of a country which ought to 
be open to all the world and which thus maintain a 
detestable state of savagery and barbarism or which 
confine all commercial advantages to a few traders 
belonging to a country which had done less for the 
initiation and welfare of mankind than my with wkich I 
am acquainted. (88) 
Elton regarded the opening of Central Africa as a logical sequel to Shepstone's 
annexation of the Transvaal and proposed to use his acquaintance with Lobengula to 
prepare the ground: 
... it becomes evident from Sir T. Shepstone's ultimatum 
that the Transvaal Republic is positively to be brought 
into Confederation with the South African colonies, and 
Matabili Land,with its undoubtedly rich mineral resources, 
will practically, after Confederation, become the Ikontier 
Native State of the countries under British Protection ... 
it will be a matter of both obvious duty and necessity for 
the cordial maintemoe of good relations with the Chief 
Lobengula, of advantage as being a direct and practical, 
although at the same time possibly an unavowed, assertion 
against Portuguese Territorial Claims, for Her Majesty's 
Government to despatch an Envoy to ... explain to the King 
the changes that have taken place and to assure him that 
he may rely upon British Friendship and Recognition of his 
Independency. I am personally acquainted with this 
Powerful Chief and have travelled in his Country. (89) 
In the event, Elton did not revisit Lobengula. Instead, the Foreign Office gave him 
leave to investigate the slave trade around Lake lklawi. In July 1877 he travelled 
up the Zambezi and Shire rivers; on December 19, in central Tanzania, he died of 
fever and dysentery and was buried under a baobab tree by his companion, Herbert 
Rhodes. (90) 
While Elton could not in any sense be said to have inspired South African 
confederation, it is evident that his reports from Mogambique claxified the inner 
logic of confederation for Carnarvon. Service in Natal and Zanzibar had shown Elton 
the profound interrelation of labour supply, mining development, the suppression of 
the slave trade and the opening of East and Central Africa. Carnarvon always read 
Eltonls reports with interest and admiration. Whenever possible, Eltonfs recommendations 
were implemented, except for the purchase of Delagoa Bay, which the Portuguese refused 
to give up for any consideration. (91) The Foreign Office readily agreed to Eltonls 
request for an assistant consul at Mo~ambique on the grounds that 
We are every dag assuming a more active Policy on the 
East Coast of Africa both as regards the suppression 
of Slave Traffic and the exploration of Africa and 
development of its resources, and from this Policy we 
can scarcely withdraw, even if we wished, considering 
the interest taken by the Public in African Affairs. (92) 
Both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office turned to Elton for advice on how to 
regard ICing Leopold's scheme for opening Central Africa to "commerce and 
civilisationw. (93) But for his untimely death, Eltan might well have displaced Harry 
Johnston as the pioneer of British East Africa and Nyasaland. Eltonls valedictory 
remarks on the northern limits of gold deposits and Ndebele power were immediately 
printed for circulation to the Royal Geographical Society, William Mackinnon, Disraeli 
and Queen Victoria. (94) Carnamronls assessment of Leopold's African proposal echoed 
Eltonrs advice: 
I should not like anyone to come too near to us to 
either on the south towards the Transvaal, which must 
be ours; or on the north too near to Egypt and the 
country which belongs to Egypt. 
In fact when I speak of geographical limits I am 
not expressing real opinion. We cannot admit 
rivals in the east or even the central part of Africa: 
and I do not see why, looking to the experience that 
we have now of English life within the tropics - the 
Zambezi should be considered to be without the range 
of our colonisation. To a considerable extent, if not 
entirely, we must be prepared to apply a sort of M u m  
[sic] bctrine to m~ch of Africa. (95) 
1 
l Goodfellow interprets this remarkable statement as a momea&ary outburst of 
enthusiasm arising from the plans Carnarvon was then laying for the -exation of the 
Transvaal. It would be more appropriately interpreted as evidence of Carmarvonls 
l complete conversion to the expansionist policies preached by the men from Natal. Since 
the 1860s, Natalians had been speaking of a Monroe Dcctrine for British Africa and 
l looking forward to the extension of Shepstoneb African administration as far as the 
Zambezi. Carnarvon's key agents in the drive for confederation were men who had 
acquired the Natal perspective developed by Shepstone and the expansionist party of 
planters, prospectors and inerchants . 
Sir ckxcnet Wolseley, who was given the task of changing Natal's constitution 
so as to overbalance the irresponsible up-country element, relied heavily on 
l Shepstonets advice and repeated Shepstonets opinions in his despatches. (96) Sir Bartle Erere, whom Carnarvon sent as Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner 
for South Africa in order to supervise the making of confederation, came alnost 
directly from Zanzibar, where he had absorbed Eltonls views on labour supply, the 
l suppression of slavery, the opening of Central Africa and the elimination of the 
Portuguese from East Africa. Shepstone was sent to the Transv~tal as governor, where 
I he might try his theory of cheap government through black chiefs, black taxes and 
l black police. 
I 
I 
The S W f  icance of Carnarvon' S Confederation Plans 
Clearly the failure of Carnarvon1s confederation plans cannot be taken as 
proof that southern Africa was not ripe for British imperial expansion in the 1870s. 
The forces which shaped Carnarvon's thinking on southern African problems were 
pe-ent features of the region. The objects for which Shepstone worked - the 
annexation of African nations, the organization of orderly labour migration, the 
eqploitation of new mineral discoveries, the governance of African locations thro- 
a form of indirect rule: these would be the dominant features of the South African 
environment in the twentieth century. The roles which Mopambig_ue and Central Africa 
would play as reservoirs of labour were perceived very early by Elton, Southey and the 
coastal party in Natal. The plans discussed by Elton and Herbert Rhodes for developing 
gold-mining in Lobengulats kingdom and thus forestalling both Transvaal and Portuguese 
expansion would be fulfilled little more than a decade later by Herbert's younger 
brother. 
The factors which scuttled Carnarvon's plans, on the other hand, were mostly 
tempomry and peculiar to the 1870s. Later mineral discoveries would erase the 
rancour axoused in the legislatures of the Cape Colony and Orange Free State by the 
annexation of Griqualad West, which fatally obstructed the passage of confederation 
legislation. (97) The individual failures of Carnarvon's chosen agents were equally 
unrelated to long-term forces in South African history. Wolesley, for instance, 
produced a constitution for Natal which still left room for obstruction from the up- 
country party; Rmre became involved in three dangerous and unsatisfactory African 
wars at the same time; Shepstone, for all his theories of cheap government, proved 
to be incapable of balancing the Transvaal budget; Elton died; Carnarvon even failed 
himself by resigning his ministry on a point of principle unrelated to African affairs. 
Different men in the same circumstances might have produced different results. 
Summary 
Lord Carnarvonts scheme for a South African Confederation in the 1870s owed 
much more than has generally been recognized to influences emanating from Natal. 
Large employers of African labour recognized in the 1860s that the local population 
could not provide a cheap,stable work-force and that immigrant workers from the 
African interior would be increasingly important to the prosperity of the colony. 
Theophilus Shepstone, Natal's Secretary for Native Affairs, used all the resources at 
his disposal to smooth the way for migrant labour, The development of diamond mining 
in Griqualand West and, to a lesser extent, gold-mining in the udenburg district of 
the Transvaal diverted large numbers of African workers aww from Ifatal and set off 
a frantic search for new sources of labour which underscored the hportance of 
ivIogambique and Central Africa as reservoirs of black labour. While planters, traders 
and officials in Natal worked to keep labour supply routes open between the Transvaal 
and Portuguese territory, officials in Griqualand West were recommending annexation of 
territories along the ttmissionary road" in order to stop Transvaal Afrikaners from 
blocking labour supply routes from Central Africa. The revival of an active British 
campaign against the East African slave trade opened another potential source of 
African labour which Shepstonels former border agent, Frederic Elton, tried to divert 
to Natal while serving, first, as an assistant to Sir Bartle Frere and John Kirk in 
Zanzibar, and later as British Consul in Mo~ambique. 
Shepstone arrived in London at a crucial point in the development of 
Camamon's thinking on southern African affairs and impressed him with hi8 lucid 
analysis of the interrelation of African administration, economic development and 
labour supply. Carnarvonls plans for confederation reflected the advice which he was 
continuously receiving from Shepstone and Elton. Their argument for confederation 
emphasized the essentially unitary nature of the developing southern African economy. 
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